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Abstract 
Major technological progress is taking place across virtually the Chinese 
defense industry’s entire spectrum from traditional sectors such as aerospace and 
seapower to the newer domains of space, information technology, and cyber. This is 
steadily narrowing the defense technological gap with the U.S. At the same time 
though, the Chinese defense industry and acquisition system is plagued by deep-
seated problems that calls into question whether the current progress is sustainable 
over the long-term. 
Understanding the state, reforms, and prospects for China’s defense industry 
and acquisition system is of critical importance to the U.S. This paper examines the 
dueling realities of China’s defense industry and acquisition system. A central 
reason why the Chinese defense industry has been able to keep costs down and 
accelerate the pace of acquisition is because it has operated on an absorption-
based, good enough development model. But as it transitions to more of an original 
innovation-based, higher end development framework, risks grow significantly and 
this will impact on the costs and pace of the acquisition process. 
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Introduction 
The opening decades of the 21st Century have been a gilded age for China’s 
defense industry and acquisition system. Lavished with high-level leadership 
attention and ample funding, the country’s armament community from scientists to 
testers have been busy on a scale not seen since the Soviet-U.S. Cold War in the 
second half of the 20th Century. Major progress is taking place across virtually the 
Chinese defense industry’s entire spectrum from traditional sectors such as 
aerospace and seapower to the newer domains of space, information technology, 
and cyber. This is steadily narrowing the defense technological gap with the U.S. 
At the same time though, the Chinese defense industry and acquisition 
system is plagued by deep-seated problems that calls into question whether the 
current progress is sustainable over the long-term. The chief defense acquisition 
tsar, Gen. Zhang Youxia, director of the Central Military Commission Armament 
Development Department (CADD) highlighted this predicament in a speech in 2014 
when he said that structural and process problems have become such an obstacle 
that the primary “bottleneck issue for armament development is no longer the 
shortage of funds or technology. Instead, institutional systems and mechanisms 
have become the greatest hurdle to armament building and development.1 Zhang 
added that if these impediments cannot be removed, future progress in weapons 
development “may just be empty talk.” Since then, the Chinese authorities have 
launched major reform initiatives to tackle these problems. 
Understanding the state, reforms, and prospects for China’s defense industry 
and acquisition system is of critical importance to the U.S., countries in the Asia-
Pacific, and the international community because of China’s rise as a global power. 
A key enabler of China’s growing might and external influence is its military 
technological capabilities, as evidenced by the acquisition of long-range power 
projection and anti-access/area denial capabilities. For the U.S, China represents a 
                                                          
1 “Speech by Zhang Youxia at General Armament Department Party Committee Enlarged Meeting,” China 
Defense Industry News, 9 January 2014. 
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‘pacing threat’ and is its chief long-term defense technological competitor. China’s 
technological transformation is one of the principal drivers behind the U.S. Defense 
Department’s Third Offset Strategy aimed at addressing the long-term erosion of 
U.S. defense technological superiority. 
This paper examines the dueling realities of China’s defense industry and 
acquisition system. The starting point is an overview of the nature and 
characteristics of the Chinese defense acquisition system. Attention will then turn to 
assessing the causes behind the rapid progress that has been made within the past 
two decades in the development of China’s defense science and technology 
capabilities and the role that the acquisition system has played. The focus will then 
turn to analyzing the structural constraints and weaknesses, especially as they 
relate to the defense acquisition system that could pose serious barriers to the 
China’s continuing defense technological and industrial advancement. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for the U.S. 
Zhang added that if these impediments cannot be removed, future progress 
in weapons development “may just be empty talk.” Since then, the Chinese 
authorities have launched major reform initiatives to tackle these problems. 
Understanding the state, reforms, and prospects for China’s defense industry 
and acquisition system is of critical importance to the U.S., countries in the Asia-
Pacific, and the international community because of China’s rise as a global power. 
A key enabler of China’s growing might and external influence is its military 
technological capabilities, as evidenced by the acquisition of long-range power 
projection and anti-access/area denial capabilities. For the U.S, China represents a 
‘pacing threat’ and is its chief long-term defense technological competitor. China’s 
technological transformation is one of the principal drivers behind the U.S. Defense 
Department’s Third Offset Strategy aimed at addressing the long-term erosion of 
U.S. defense technological superiority. 
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This paper examines the dueling realities of China’s defense industry and 
acquisition system. The starting point is an overview of the nature and 
characteristics of the Chinese defense acquisition system. Attention will then turn to 
assessing the causes behind the rapid progress that has been made within the past 
two decades in the development of China’s defense science and technology 
capabilities and the role that the acquisition system has played. The focus will then 
turn to analyzing the structural constraints and weaknesses, especially as they 
relate to the defense acquisition system that could pose serious barriers to the 
China’s continuing defense technological and industrial advancement. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for the U.S. 
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The Nature of the Chinese Defense Acquisition 
System 
Although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in coordination with the Chinese 
defense industry has been engaged in the design, engineering, test and evaluation, 
production, and operation and support of defense systems since the 1950s, 
acquisition was considered of lower-order importance compared to war-fighting, 
political discipline, and logistics until the end of the 1990s. It was not until 1998 that 
the PLA high command established a separate acquisition organization called the 
General Armament Department (GAD) to serve alongside the General Staff 
Department (GSD), General Political Department, and General Logistics 
Department. 
Previously, the acquisition system had been divided between two competing 
systems. One portion was manned by serving military officers worked within the 
GSD as well as in armament management entities at the service-level, while another 
component comprised civilians and uniformed personnel were attached to the 
Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 
(COSTIND) that was a state entity and represented the interests of the civilian 
defense industry. This bifurcated arrangement was a product of the Socialist central 
planning system that managed the Chinese economy between the 1950s until the 
1990s. It meant that the acquisition system was compartmentalized between civilian 
and military masters, which led to constant and often bitter bureaucratic infighting 
because these two groups had widely divergent interests. As the consumer, the 
military wanted weapons that could be produced on time, met its specifications and 
were cost-effective. But the defense industry had little incentive to meet the PLA’s 
requirements because it faced little competition. 
The establishment of the GAD led to a far-reaching reorganization of the 
acquisition system. A crucial change was that the GAD assumed primary 
responsibility for acquisition matters, while the defense industry –through COSTIND 
–was relegated to a supporting role. This change did not happen overnight though 
and met with considerable resistance because of the entrenched control that the 
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defense industry had enjoyed over the acquisition process for several decades. But 
the GAD gradually consolidated its management of the acquisition system until it 
was replaced by the CADD at the beginning of 2016. 
A defining characteristic of the current Chinese defense acquisition system is 
that it operates as a classic command and control regulatory system. The military 
authorities rely on administrative coercion and threats to achieve compliance, they 
are responsible for direct micro-management and rule-making, and the primary 
focus of rules and regulations are more on addressing what enterprises do rather 
than on their performance or outputs.
2 While this top-down regulatory approach may 
work in a centrally planned system, it is poorly suited to market-based environments. 
One major reason is that activity-based intervention requires regulatory agencies to 
have adequate information to monitor what is going on, but their access to data is 
limited in more open markets because they are required to play a less direct 
regulatory role and allow enterprises greater autonomy and privacy. 
The model used in the U.S. and other advanced economies is the 
independent regulatory system that emphasizes the importance of political 
independence, impartiality, and transparency. The Chinese defense industry began 
to take concrete steps towards the establishment of a more independent regulatory 
structure in the late 1990s, especially taking advantage of reforms to separate the 
military-civilian regulatory system by rolling back the authority and intervention of 
COSTIND and allowing defense corporations to have greater autonomy. 
COSTIND’s status and influence was further reduced in 2008 when it was demoted 
from a super-ministry to a sub-ministerial agency under the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT) and retitled as the State Administration for Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND).3 
Another distinguishing feature of the Chinese defense acquisition system is 
                                                          
2 See Anthony Ogus, Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, Processes and Legal Forms in 
Industrialized Countries (Centre on Regulation and Competition, University of Manchester, December 2002), 
21-22. 
 
3 See Mao Guohui (Ed), Introduction to the Military Armament Legal System (军事装 备法律制度概论) 
(Beijing; National Defense Industry Press [国防工业出版社], 2012), 58-60. 
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that it operates a predominately absorptive model of technology development. This 
is typical of catch-up countries whose domestic research and development 
capabilities still lag the world’s advanced defense technology powers. Absorption-
oriented acquisition systems organize and operate in a fundamentally different way 
from innovation-based systems like the U.S. Two differences stand out. First, 
absorption is a low-risk, high reward enterprise because the technological 
development path has already been mapped out. Second, absorptive systems place 
overwhelming priority in investing in engineering, capabilities, especially related to 
reverse engineering, and less on research and development. 
The primary benefits from absorption are significant cost savings and time 
reductions. This has allowed the Chinese defense establishment to narrow, and in a 
few cases eliminate, the technological gap with regional and global competitors in an 
expanding number of areas. The biggest beneficiaries have been in the aviation, 
naval shipbuilding, and select precision strike missile sectors. Without these 
technological achievements that are being translated into operational capabilities, 
the PLA’s shift to a more regionally assertive and maritime-oriented posture would 
have been little more than empty talk. 
The military aviation sector has been especially reliant on the leveraging of 
foreign technology transfers to support its development.4 A significant proportion of 
the country’s combat aircraft development programs have depended on foreign, 
mostly Russian, technology inputs. These technology transfers come in several 
forms: 
 Reverse engineering: The Chinese aviation industry has been able to 
reverse engineer complete platforms acquired through license assembly 
agreements (Su-27), off-the-shelf purchases (Su-30MK2), and opportunistic 
acquisition of prototypes (Su-33), which it then adapts and indigenizes with 
local sub-systems and components. A substantial proportion of the PLA Air 
Force’s combat inventory consists of these re-innovated aircraft, such as the 
J-11B (Su-27), J-15 (Su-33), and J-16 (Su-30MK2). 
 Research and development assistance: A number of Chinese ‘indigenous’ 
programs have received extensive levels of foreign assistance in their design 
and development, including co-design and co-development. Much of the 
                                                          
4 For useful background analysis, see Philip Saunders and Joshua Wiseman, Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s 
Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies (Washington D.C, National Defense University, Center 
for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, 2011.   
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original design of the J-10A fighter, for example, was from Israel. China and 
Russia are also reportedly close to signing an agreement on the co-design 
and development of a heavy-lift helicopter, of which Russia is in charge of 
aerodynamics design and China providing avionics systems.5 
 Critical components and sub-systems: While the overall technological level 
of the Chinese aviation industry is steadily improving, there are pockets of 
backwardness in critical components and sub-systems. High-end turbofan jet 
engines stand out as the biggest weakness, which has made China 
dependent on Russian engines. 
 Enabling technologies: As the Chinese aviation industry becomes more 
sophisticated across all the stages of the research, development and 
acquisition process, it is sourcing foreign assistance for wind tunnels, 
computer-aided design and manufacturing software, and advanced production 
equipment such as multi-axis machine tools. 
Foreign technology has also played an influential role in the improving 
technological performance of the naval shipbuilding industry. This was especially the 
case from the 1990s to the mid-2000s when there was extensive importation of 
Russian technology and knowhow. As Chinese shipbuilders absorbed these 
transfers, they have been able to substantially reduce their foreign reliance in the 
past decade. A 2015 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence assessment of the equipment 
modernization of the PLA Navy’s surface fleet noted that, “By the second decade of 
the 2000s, the PLA(N)’s surface production shifted to platforms using wholly 
Chinese designs and that were primarily equipped with Chinese weapons and 
sensors (though some engineering components and subsystems remain imported or 
license produced in country).”6 
The ONI report noted that the last purchase of a foreign naval platform was 
the Sovremennyy-II guided missile destroyer in 2006 and since then the Chinese 
naval shipbuilding industry has been engaged in “much longer production runs of its 
domestically produced surface combatants and conventional submarines, suggesting 
greater satisfaction with recent designs. The Jiangkai-class (Type 054A) frigate 
series, Luyang-class (Type 052B/C/D) guided missile destroyer (DDG) series, and 
the upcoming new cruiser (Type 055) class are considered to be modern and 
capable designs that are comparable in many respects to the most modern Western 
warships.”  
                                                          
5 “China, Russia to Co-Develop Heavy-Lift Helicopter in 2016”, China Daily, 10 September 2015 
6 U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Missions and Capabilities for the 21st Century 
(Washington D.C., Office of Naval Intelligence, April 2015, p14. 
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Faster and Cheaper: China’s Accelerated Defense 
Acquisition Process and Comparisons with U.S. 
Accelerated Programs 
Taking advantage of the absorptive low risk, high reward development model, 
the Chinese defense acquisition community has been able to successfully undertake 
the rapid development, production and deployment of select high priority weapons 
projects over the past couple of decades. The speed of China’s achievements initially 
surprised outside observers, especially in the late 2000s and early 2010s when a 
number of Chinese programs were unveiled.
7   This is because of the checkered 
historical track record of the Chinese defense industry, especially before the late 
1990s, in which many projects failed or were seriously delayed because of 
bureaucratic red tape, lack of support, or inadequate resources. 
The Chinese accelerated acquisition process has some of the following 
features: 
 Concurrent development, testing, and low rate initial production: This sees the 
compression, overlapping, or even skipping of various phases in the 
acquisition process with the goal of getting programs into production and 
deployment as quickly as possible. Some of this compression occurs with 
concurrent technology maturation, risk reduction, and development as well as 
concurrent production and deployment. 
 Accelerated research & engineering development, but often lengthy delays in 
early production phases: A number of Chinese weapon development programs 
have been rushed through the initial research and development phases, but 
then spend extended periods of time undergoing prototyping or 
demonstration testing. If compared to the U.S. acquisition process, this 
would be the equivalent of manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) 5 
(capability to produce prototype components in a production relevant 
environment) and 8 (pilot line capability demonstrated; ready to begin low 
rate initial production). 
 High-level leadership attention and active intervention: The Chinese 
authorities have designated the development of a small hand-picked number 
                                                          
7 For example, Vice Admiral David Dorsett, deputy chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, said in 
2011 that the US intelligence community has “been pretty consistent in underestimating the delivery and IOC 
[initial operational capability] of Chinese technology, weapon systems. They’ve entered operational capability 
quicker [than expected].” Transcript of Defense Writers Group roundtable with Adm. Dorsett, 5 January 2011.   
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of strategic weapons and technology capabilities to be critical national 
priority and have established oversight mechanisms to allow senior top-level 
national leaders such as the Communist Party General Secretary, who is 
concurrently the commander-in-chief, and prime minister to be involved in 
program review and decision-making. The benefits from this top-level 
engagement include access to resources and fewer bureaucratic obstacles, 
but drawbacks include political interference and more reporting requirements 
that impacts project management. 
 Trial batch production runs followed by upgrading to improved variants: A 
distinguishing pattern of Chinese weapons development programs in recent 
years has been the manufacturing of very small batches of platforms, often 
numbering no more than one or two items, which are put into operational 
service. This is followed with upgraded variants that are also produced in 
small numbers until the end-users are satisfied and allows for larger 
production runs. 
These features of the accelerated acquisition model can be found in a number 
of current Chinese weapons development programs. They include the Chengdu J-
20 and Shenyang J-15 carrier-borne fighter aircraft, Type 052 DDG, and the Xian Y-
20 heavy-lift transport aircraft (see table 1). The 052 DDG and J-15 fighter programs 
are prime examples of this fast track model as they have compressed research 
cycles to milestone A (4-5 years for the 052 DDG and 2-3 years for the J-15), but 
lengthy periods for technology, engineering, and demonstration to low rate initial 
production. 
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Table 1: Acquisition Cycles for Four Chinese Fighter Aircraft, Transport 
Aircraft and Warship Programs 
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This accelerated Chinese acquisition process has similarities with the more 
advanced defense acquisition system. The U.S. has also been engaged in efforts to 
speed up its defense acquisition processes, especially in the past couple of decades 
in response to its long-term wars and military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
other parts of the Middle East.
8 A 2016 study of accelerated U.S. defense acquisition 
programs by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) identified several types of fast 
track mechanisms:9 
1. Time-constrained acquisition: Cost and performance are the primary 
drivers of acquisition programs, but more attention is now being paid to 
schedule needs, including to make it a key performance parameter and 
management priority; 
2. Crash programs: These are extremely urgent and high priority programs 
managed by specially created high-level entities that involve the development 
of early stage technologies with potentially far-reaching disruptive impact. A 
U.S. example is the F-117A stealth fighter and a Chinese example is its 
development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in the 1950s-1970s; 
3. Rapid acquisition programs: These projects are aimed to meet urgent 
operational requirements but involve the development of mature ‘off-the-shelf’ 
capabilities and managed by entities located within the regular defense 
acquisition system. The MRAP is a U.S. example and the DF-21C anti-ship 
ballistic missile is a Chinese example; 
4. Early fielding experiments: This refers to promising technologies that are 
emerging or ready for operational use but lacks interest from end-users for 
acquisition, so the defense acquisition system or defense companies build 
operational prototypes to experiment. The Global Hawk, Predator, and 
Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles are U.S. examples, while the Shenyang 
FC-31 stealth fighter is a Chinese early fielding experiment. 
5. Spiral/evolutionary acquisition: This is a cyclical or iterative approach that 
allows for the incremental development of new capabilities, especially for 
information technology and software projects. 
The IDA study identifies top-level leadership support, management, and 
intervention as the most important factor for the success of U.S. accelerated 
programs, which is also the case for Chinese programs.
                                                          
8 US. Department of Defense, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, No. 5000.02, January 2015, 
p13.   
 
9 Richard Van Atta, R. Royce Kneece Jr., and Michael Lippitz, Assessment of Accelerated Acquisition of 
Defense Programs (Washington DC: Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2016).   
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Opportunities and Progress in China’s Defense 
Technological Development and the Role of the 
Defense Acquisition System 
China’s defense industry has been enjoying a remarkable renaissance in its 
fortunes since the turn of the 21st Century. Driven by leadership concerns of 
mounting challenges to the country’s external security environment and rapid 
advances in the global technological order, investment into research, development, 
and acquisition has soared, greater efforts are being made to acquire and absorb 
foreign technologies, and the existing defense innovation system is being remade. 
This has resulted in significant improvements in technological, economic, and 
industrial performance. Defense corporations are posting ever-bigger record annual 
profits and the armaments research and development pipeline is bulging. The 
aviation sector, for example, is simultaneously engaged in the development or 
production of more than half a dozen combat and transport aircraft, while the 
shipbuilding industry has at least four active nuclear and conventional submarine 
programs along with research, development, and construction of aircraft carriers, 
destroyers, and numerous other surface warships. The PLA Navy is estimated to 
have laid down, launched, or commissioned more than 60 vessels in 2014 and 
2015,
10 and commissioned 18 ships in 2016, including 1 Type 052D DDG, 3 Type 
054A guided missile frigates and 6 Type 056 corvettes.
11 The space industry is also 
pursuing a highly ambitious across-the-board development, including manned, 
lunar, anti-satellite, and satellite projects. 
A number of key factors have played instrumental roles behind the improving 
performance of the defense industry. They include high-level leadership support, a 
clear well-defined long-term vision backed up with detailed development plans and a 
more capable acquisition system, the growing role of defense corporations, the 
                                                          
10 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Missions and Capabilities for the 21st Century, April 
2015, 13. 
 
11 “Navy Upgrades Missile Destroyer,” China Military Online, 22 February 2017 and "New 'Carrier Killer' 
Delivered to Fleet”, China Daily, 24 January 2017.   
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nurturing of a defense innovation system and overhaul of the research and 
development apparatus, and efforts to promote the integration of the civilian and 
defense economies. 
1.  Top Leadership Support 
High-level and sustained support and guidance from the political and military 
leadership elites is essential in the Chinese defense industry’s ability to carry out 
innovation activities. Leadership backing and intervention has been vital in 
addressing entrenched bureaucratic fragmentation, institutional 
compartmentalization, and chronic project management problems that cause 
prolonged delays, decision-making paralysis, and cost overruns. Without outside 
leadership involvement, there would have been a high chance that many 
achievements of the defense industry would not have happened, especially the 
turnaround in the defense industry since the end of the 1990s. 
The central leadership’s direct and continuing involvement and oversight in 
the operations of the defense industry and of critical projects is essential. This is 
often done through the establishment of leadership small groups and special 
committees. The committed involvement of the country’s top leaders is also critical, 
and the defense industry has been fortunate that Xi Jinping has taken a keen and 
active interest in defense issues. Xi has paid particular attention to the development 
of China’s defense and overall innovation capabilities as demonstrated by his 
intensive engagement in defense and science and technology matters. Between 
November 2012 when Xi assumed power and the end of 2016, he took part in 36 
publicly reported events related to military and defense science, technology, and 
industrial issues. By comparison, Xi’s predecessors such as Hu Jintao and Jiang 
Zemin made far fewer defense-related site visits during the same periods of their 
rule. 
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Reported Visits to Military and Defense Science and Technology-Related Facilities 
Made by Xi Jinping, November 2012-December 2016 
2.  Adhering to Medium and Long-Term Strategic Planning 
Research and development of China’s defense technological capabilities has 
benefited considerably from the formulation and implementation of medium-term (5 
years) and long-term (10-20 years) armament development plans. These strategic 
and planning guidances provide long-term planning stability, helps to mitigate 
against parochial bureaucratic interests and political intervention, and more 
rigorously links the weapons acquisition process with threat assessments. 
One of the most important of these plans is the 2006-2020 Medium and Long-
Term Defense Science and Technology Development Plan (MLDP) that focuses on 
guiding defense-related basic and applied research and development over a 15-year 
time horizon.
12 COSTIND drafted the MLDP in the mid-2000s in coordination with a 
                                                          
12 Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, “Outline of Defense Medium and 
Long Term Science and Technology Development Plan” (国防科技工业中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要), 29 
May 2006.   
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national medium and long-term science and technology development plan (MLP) 
and targeted the development of China’s defense research and development 
capabilities and innovation eco-system in a number of areas. 
First was the focus on enhancing the capacity for original innovation through 
the building of defense laboratories, research institutes and universities to promote 
basic science along with the development of service support capabilities such as 
technology transfer and commercialization mechanisms. A second priority was the 
building of a robust governance regime, especially in areas such as regulations, 
intellectual property protection, and establishing a comprehensive standards system. 
A third area targeted was civil-military integration. The overall goal of the MLDP was 
to significantly narrow the technological gap with the world’s leading defense 
technological powers by 2020. 
Another important medium-term defense science and technology development 
plan is the New High-Technology Program, which is also known as the 995 Program 
in reference to the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 
that was the spark for this project.
13 The Chinese leadership’s reaction to the attack 
was to sharply intensify efforts to develop strategic weapons systems, or what the 
PLA terms “Assassin’s Mace” or Shashoujian capabilities. According to Gen. Zhang 
Wannian, who was a CMC vice chairman during the Belgrade Embassy crisis, the 
CMC convened an emergency meeting immediately following the bombing, and one 
of the key decisions made at the meeting was to “accelerate the development of 
Shashoujian armaments.”14 
Zhang pointed out that then CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin was especially 
insistent on the need to step up the pace of development of Shashoujian mega-
projects, saying that “what the enemy is most fearful of, this is what we should be 
developing.”
15 As the “enemy” was the United States, the implication was that the 
                                                          
13 There is no official Chinese acknowledgement of the 995 Project, but there are occasional allusions to it in 
media reports, writings by Chinese military analysts, résumés of Chinese scientists, and project listings of 
university laboratories and companies engaged in defense-related work. See, for example, Zeng Li, “Investment 
in Defense Science and Technology,” Science and Technology Daily [科技日报], April 30, 2009.   
 
14 Zhang Wannian Writing Team, Biography of Zhang Wannian (张万年传) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 
2011), 416. 
15 Ibid, 419. 
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defense and strategic science, technology, and innovation systems should be 
engaged in developing asymmetric capabilities targeting US vulnerabilities. 
3.  The Central Role of Defense Conglomerates 
The revival of China’s ten major state-owned defense corporations since the 
beginning of the 21st Century has had a major impact in shifting the center of gravity 
for research, development, and innovation from research academies and 
universities towards enterprises. These conglomerates, each of which have between 
100 to more than 200 subsidiaries, have sought to transform themselves from loss-
making quasi-state bureaucracies to become more market-driven enterprises. They 
have been slimmed down, allowed to shed heavy debt burdens, and given access 
to new sources of investment, especially from the capital markets. 
Combined with a strong pickup in defense and civilian orders, these 
companies have become highly profitable since the mid to late 2000s. Around two-
thirds of the defence industry’s annual revenue comes from civilian operations, such 
as automobiles and white goods. The aviation, space/missile, defense electronics, 
and naval sectors have been the chief beneficiaries from this rising tide of defense 
procurement, while the ordnance industry has enjoyed considerable success from 
sales of civilian products such as motor vehicles. These corporations are now 
engaged in an ambitious expansion strategy to become global arms and strategic 
technology champions. 
4.  Building of a Defense Innovation System and Research 
and Development Base 
The Chinese defense innovation system, and especially its research and 
development component, has been undergoing a significant overhaul and expansion 
to meet growing demand for its services from the PLA and also as part of a larger 
development of the national innovation system. The development of a robust defense 
R&D system is a top priority in defense science and technology development plans 
such as the MLDP, which emphasizes a number of key goals. A top priority is the 
shifting of ownership and funding of key portions of the state-controlled defense 
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R&D apparatus to the country’s defense conglomerates. The primary goals of this 
reform include: 1) reducing the dependence of the R&D apparatus to state funding; 
2) increasing the amount of investment that firms devote to R&D, especially in 
applied and commercial development; and 3) speeding up the exploitation and 
commercialization of proprietary R&D output. 
Another high-level priority is the development of an extensive defense 
laboratory system that would pave the way for long-term technological 
breakthroughs. Around 90 laboratories belonging to both the defense industry and 
PLA have so far been established. It will take some time though before these 
research outfits are able to conduct high quality R&D because they lack experienced 
and top-rated scientific personnel. 
5.  Civil-Military Integration 
Intensifying efforts have been made since the early 2000s to forge close 
linkages between the civilian and defense economies to allow the defense industry 
to gain access to more advanced and more globalized civilian sectors. This has led 
to the development of some modest functional and geographical pockets of civil-
military activity since the early to mid-2000s. The electronics, information technology, 
high technology, and automotive sectors have been in the vanguard. 
Another area of growing CMI activity is the competitive opening up of the 
defence research, development, and acquisition system to the private sector that 
until a few years ago was the exclusive preserve of the ten state-owned 
conglomerates that monopolized the aviation, space and missile, ordnance, nuclear, 
electronics, and shipbuilding sectors that make up the defence industrial base. More 
than 1000 private firms have so far received licenses that allow them to bid for 
contracts, although it is likely that the overwhelming flow of business still goes to the 
established state giants because they have deep-seated connections in a non-
transparent and under-regulated system. 
The use of capital markets to fund the development and production of 
weapons projects is the third area in which CMI initiatives are being pursued and 
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this has potentially the most significant near and longer-term impact on innovation. 
While defence companies have been allowed to list subsidiaries on stock markets 
since the 1990s, this was limited to their non-defence operations. This changed in 
2013 when SASTIND permitted firms to issue share placements using military 
assets as securitization. 
The high level of state commitment to the defence industry shows few signs of 
weakening anytime soon, despite the noticeable slowing of growth in the national 
economy in the past couple of years. For defence research and development, the 
investment in national science and technology activities is a useful proxy indicator of 
political support and the trajectory in growth rates in science and technology. China’s 
research and development expenditure in 2015 was Rmb 1.42 trillion ($208 billion), 
which was 2.07 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a sizeable increase of 
8.9 percent from the 2014 spending of Rmb 1.34 trillion.
16 However, it is not known 
how much was spent on defence-related activities. The Chinese authorities have set 
a target for science and technology spending to reach 2.5 percent of GDP by 2020, 
which would mean even higher growth rates in budget growth for the next few years. 
  
                                                          
16 “China's R&D Spending Rises, Still Lags Behind Developed Nations”, Xinhua News Agency, 12 November 
2016. 
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Constraints and Weaknesses in China’s Defense 
Industry and Acquisition System 
The principal constraints and weaknesses that the Chinese defense Industry 
faces at present stem from its historical foundations and the uncertain efforts to 
overcome the corrosive legacy of its difficult history. The institutional and normative 
foundations and workings of the Chinese defense industry were copied from the 
former Soviet Union’s command defense industry and continues to exert a powerful 
influence to the present- day. The PLA and defense industrial regulatory authorities 
are seeking to replace this outdated top-down administrative management model 
with a more competitive and indirect regulatory regime, but there are strong vested 
interests that do not want to see any major changes. 
1.  Monopolies 
One of the biggest hurdles that PLA and civilian defense acquisition 
specialists point out is the defense industry’s monopoly structure. Little competition 
exists to win major weapons systems and defense equipment because each of 
China’s six defense industrial sectors is closed to outside competition and are 
dominated by a select handful state- owned defense corporations. Contracts are 
typically awarded through single sourcing mechanisms to these corporations. 
Competitive bidding and tendering only takes place for non-combat support 
equipment, such as logistics supplies. 
An effort in 1999 to inject more competition by splitting corporations that 
monopolized their sectors into two separate entities did little to curb monopolistic 
practices because these firms focused on different areas of business in their 
domains and there was little direct rivalry. These powerful defense firms have 
subsequently sought to reverse this effort at de-monopolization by finding ways to 
re-merge or collaborate together. In 2008, the aviation industry made the first and so 
far only successful challenge by consolidating its two post-1999 entities back into a 
single monopoly structure. There have been occasional reports that the space and 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 22 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
shipbuilding sectors might also seek to re-establish a single holding company 
arrangement. 
2.  Bureaucratic Fragmentation 
A second serious weakness that has seriously handicapped the effectiveness 
of Chinese defense industry is its bureaucratic fragmentation. This is a common 
characteristic of the Chinese organizational system, but is especially virulent within 
the large and unwieldy defense sector. A key feature of the Soviet approach to 
defense industrialization that China imported was a highly divided, segmented and 
stratified structure and process. There was strict separation between the defense and 
civilian sectors as well as between defense contractors and military end-users, 
compartmentalization between the conventional defense and strategic weapons 
sectors as well as among the different conventional defense industrial sub-sectors, 
and division between research and development entities and production units. Key 
reasons for this excessive compartmentalization include an obsessive desire for 
secrecy and the powerful influence of the deeply ingrained Chinese model of vertical 
functional systems (tiao tiao) that encouraged large-scale industries like those in the 
defense and supporting heavy industrial sectors such as iron and steel and 
chemicals to become independent fiefdoms. 
This severe structural compartmentalization is a major obstacle to the 
development of innovative and advanced weapons capabilities because it requires 
consensus-based decision making that is carried out through extensive 
negotiations, bargaining, and exchanges. This management by committee is 
cumbersome, risk-adverse, and results in a lack of strong ownership that is critical 
to ensure that projects are able to succeed the thicket of bureaucratic red tape and 
cut-throat competition for funding. 
When the Chinese authorities in the late 1950s began to pursue the 
development of strategic weapons programs such as nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missiles, they recognized that the fragmented nature of the defense industrial 
economy represented a potentially fatal weakness, so they designed a special high-
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level leadership arrangement called the Central Special Committee (CSC) to provide 
the decisive leadership support needed for high-priority strategic projects.
17 The 
CSC played a central role in ensuring the successful development of China’s 
strategic weapons capabilities, so much so that the Chinese authorities resurrected 
this leadership group in the late 1980s to oversee the initial development of key 
strategic programs. The CSC has played an important role in the early development 
of the Shenzhou manned space project, for example, and has been mentioned in 
other major strategic technology programs such as nuclear submarine development 
and other space projects. 
This entrenched bureaucratic fragmentation is a prominent feature of the 
armament management system. Although the GAD was one of the PLA’s four 
general headquarters departments with a seat on the CMC, it was only responsible 
for managing the armament needs of the ground forces, People’s Armed Police, 
select space programs, and the militia.
18 The navy, air force, and Second Artillery had 
their own armament bureaucracies, and competition is fierce for budgetary 
resources to support projects favored by each of these services. This 
compartmentalized structure served to intensify parochial interests and undermines 
efforts to promote joint undertakings. 
The defense acquisition system also suffers from compartmentalization along 
many segments of the acquisition process. Responsibilities for research and 
development, testing, procurement, production and maintenance are in the hands of 
different units and under-institutionalization has meant that linkages among these 
entities tend to be ad hoc in nature with major gaps in oversight, reporting, and 
information sharing.
19 The fragmented nature of the acquisition process may help to 
explain why Hu Jintao was apparently caught by surprise by the first publicized test-
flight of the J-20 fighter aircraft that occurred during the visit of U.S. Defense 
                                                          
17 See Tai Ming Cheung, “The Special One: The Central Special Committee and the Structure, Process, and 
Leadership of the Chinese Defense and Strategic Dual-Use Science, Technology and Industrial Triangle”, 
Unpublished conference paper, July 2012. 
18 See Mao Guohui (Ed), Introduction to the Military Armament Legal System (Beijing; National Defense 
Industry Press, 2012), 46.   
19 See Liu Hanrong and Wang Baoshun, eds. National Defense Scientific Research Test Project 
Management (Beijing; National Defense Industry Press, 2009).   
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Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011.20 
3.  Weak Acquisition Management Mechanisms 
A third major weakness is that the PLA continues to rely on outdated 
administrative tools to manage acquisition projects with defense contractors in the 
absence of the establishment of an effective contract management system. The PLA 
did implement the use of contracts on a trial basis in the late 1980s with the 
introduction of a contract responsibility system.
21 These contracts are administrative 
in nature though and have little legal rights because of a lack of a developed legal 
framework within the defense industry. Consequently, contracts are vague and do 
not define contractual obligations or critical performance issues such as quality, 
pricing, or schedules. Contracts for complex weapons projects can be as short as 1-
2 pages, according to analysts.22 
Moreover, the military acquisition apparatus is woefully backward in many 
other management approaches and tools that it uses compared to its counterparts in 
the U.S. and other advanced military powers. It has yet to adopt total life-cycle 
management methods, for example, and many internal management information 
systems are on stand- alone networks that prevent effective communications and 
coordination. One analyst said that this often meant that the only way for project 
teams to exchange information was through paper transactions.23 
4.  Outdated Acquisition Pricing Regime 
A fourth serious weakness is the lack of a transparent pricing system for 
weapons and other military equipment, representing a lack of trust between the PLA 
and defense industry. The existing armament pricing framework is based on a ‘cost-
plus’ model that dates to the planning economy, in which contractors are allowed 5 
                                                          
20 John Pomfret. “Chinese Army Tests Jet During Gates Visit,” Washington Post, 12 January 2011, and 
Elizabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, “Chinese Army Test Jet as Gates Visits,” New York Times, 12 January 
2011.   
21 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2008), 83-85.   
22 Interview with PLA acquisition specialist, Beijing, November 2011.   
23 Ibid.   
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percent profit margins on top of actual costs.
24 There are a number of drawbacks to 
this model that holds back efficiency and innovation. One is that contractors are 
incentivized to push up costs as this would also drive up profits. Another problem is 
that contractors are not rewarded with finding ways to lower costs such as through 
more streamlined management or more cost- effective designs or manufacturing 
techniques. Contracts rarely have performance incentives, which discourage risk-
taking and adoption of new innovative approaches. 
To address this long-standing problem, the PLA, Ministry of Finance, and 
National Development and Reform Commission held a high-level meeting on 
armament pricing reform in 2009 that concluded that the outdated pricing system 
had seriously restricted weapons development and innovation.
25 A number of reform 
proposals were put forward: 1) provide incentives to contain costs; 2) switch from 
accounting procedures that focus on ex post pricing to ex ante controls; and 3) 
expand from a single pricing methodology to multiple pricing methods. 
At the beginning of 2014, the GAD announced that it would conduct and 
expand upon pilot projects on equipment pricing. These reforms include the 
strengthening of the pricing verification of purchased goods, improving cost controls, 
shifting from singular to plural pricing models, from ‘after-purchase pricing’ to ‘whole 
process pricing’, and from ‘individual cost pricing’ to ‘social average cost pricing’.
26 
These represent modest steps in the pricing reform process, but the PLA will 
continue to face fierce opposition from the defense industry on this issue. 
5.  Corruption 
A fifth impediment is corruption, which appears to have thrived with the 
defense industry’s uncertain transition from centralized state planning to a more 
competitive and indirect management model.
27 PLA leaders have highlighted the 
RDA system as one of a number of high-risk areas in which corruption can flourish 
                                                          
24 Mao Guohui, Introduction to the Military Armament Legal System, 158-159.   
25 Zong Zhaodun and Zhao Bo, “Major Reform Considered in Work on the Prices of Our Army's Armaments”, 
Liberation Army Daily, 13 November 2009.   
26 "Armament Work: It Is the Right Time for Reform and Innovation", Liberation Army Daily, 13 February 2014.   
27 Corruption is defined broadly in China as covering the improper behavior of state, party, or military officials, but 
the more common Western definition is the abuse of public office for personal gain in violation of rules.   
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along with the selection and promotion of officials, the enrollment of students in 
PLA-affiliated schools, funds management, and construction work.28 
At the PLA’s annual conference on military discipline inspection work in 
January 2014, CMC Vice-Chairman General. Xu Qiliang, who heads the PLA’s anti-
corruption efforts, pointed out that armament research, production, and procurement 
was one of two areas that required “better oversight”.
29 The other area that Xu 
highlighted was construction projects, which has been plagued by a number of high-
profile corruption scandals in recent years. 
The almost complete absence of public reporting on corruption in the defense 
industry and acquisition system means that the extent of the problem is not known. 
Military authorities justify this lack of transparency as many of the cases are likely to 
involve classified programs. In the latest anti-corruption crackdown that begun with Xi 
Jinping’s ascent to power at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, there have 
only been a handful of cases of defense industry executives being arrested on 
corruption charges.
30
                                                          
28 “PLA Gets Tough On Duty Crimes”, Xinhua News Agency, 1 December 2014.   
29 “CMC Vice Chairman Stresses Effective Anti-Corruption”, Liberation Army Daily, 17 January 2014.   
30 See, for example, “Wu Hao, Deputy General Manager of AVIC Heavy Machinery Under Investigation for 
Corruption, Xinjing Bao, 4 June 2014.   
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The Next Stage in China’s Defense Technological 
Transformation: Formulating New Long-Term Plans 
and the Reform of the Defense Acquisition System 
The Xi Jinping administration signaled its intention to carry out a major 
overhaul of the defense industry as part of an ambitious national program of 
economic and military reforms at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 
2013. A flurry of activity since then by defense industrial decision-makers has 
produced new medium and long-term defense industrial development strategies, 
plans, and institutional arrangements that collectively represent a potentially key 
turning point in the defense industry’s evolution from an innovation follower to 
becoming an original innovation leader. After almost two years of investigation, a 
reform plan was approved and released at the CMC Working Conference on Reform 
in November 2015, which marked the formal start of the implementation of the most 
far-reaching structural reform of the PLA in its history.31 
While these reforms were targeted at the PLA’s central, regional, and service 
commands, it also had important implications for the armament management 
system, which plays a highly influential role in defense science, technology, and 
industrial matters. At the end of 2015, the PLA’s armament system underwent a far-
reaching reorganization:32 
 The GAD was reorganized into the CADD and given responsibility for the 
centralized unified management of the military armament system.33 
 The GAD Science and Technology Committee was elevated to a commission-
level rank reporting directly to the CMC and renamed as the CMC Science 
and Technology Committee (CSTC). 
Although it will take some time before these reforms are fully implemented and 
can be adequately assessed, some initial speculative thoughts can be offered. First, 
                                                          
31 “Documentary of the Design Process of Deepening Defense and Military Reform by Xi Jinping and the CMC”, 
Sina.com, 30 December 2015, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2015-12-30/doc-ifxncyar6047368.shtml.   
32 “Central Military Commission Issues ‘Opinions Concerning Deepening the Reform of National Defense and the 
Armed Forces’”, Xinhua Domestic Service, 1 January 2016.   
33 “Ministry of National Defense Holds News Conference on CMC Administrative Reform and Reorganization,” 
China Military Online, 11 January 2016. 
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the promotion of the CSTC from the GAD to the CMC demonstrates that the 
Chinese military authorities, and especially Xi, are increasingly serious about 
engaging in higher- end STI activities and establishing a high-level coordinating 
mechanism through the CSTC to provide operational leadership and guidance. 
Second, the ability of the new CADD to carry out its mandate of providing 
centralized management of the armament system looks to have a greater chance of 
success than the GAD, which was hamstrung by its institutional bias towards the 
oversight of the ground forces. The nature of the relationship between the CADD 
and the armament departments belonging to the service arms will be critical in 
determining how much jointness versus compartmentalization there will in the PLA’s 
armaments development. The authority and influence of the CADD will benefit with 
the appointment of GAD Director Gen. Zhang Youxia as its new head, who 
reportedly has close ties with Xi.34 
In parallel, the state defense industrial bureaucracy has formulated new 
strategies and plans for a significant adjustment to the defense industry as well as to 
chart its medium and long-term transformation. One of these key plans is the 13th 
Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Five Year Plan (13th Defense S&T 
FYP). This plan was issued at the beginning of 2016 and sets out six key tasks to 
2020: 1) facilitating so-called ‘leapfrog’ development of weapons and military 
equipment; 2) enhancing innovation capabilities in turnkey areas; 3) improving 
overall quality and efficiency; 4) optimizing the structure of the defense industry and 
vigorously promoting civil-military integration; 5) accelerating the export of 
armaments and military equipment; and 6) supporting national economic and social 
construction.35 
Compared to its predecessor, the 13th Defense S&T FYP has a stronger 
focus on the development of high-technology weaponry and civil-military integration. 
It also signals a significant shift in the direction of defense industry development 
from absorption and re- innovation to giving greater emphasis to original innovation. 
                                                          
34 “Former GAD Director Zhang Youxia Becomes New Director of CMC Armament Development Department,” 
The Paper, 14 January 2016. 
35 “2016 National Defense Science, Technology and Industry Working Conference was held in Beijing”, State 
Council, 9 January 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-01/09/content_5031770.htm.   
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The 13th FYP also shows that China is seeking to build on the inroads it has been 
steadily making in the international arms market. Chinese arms sales have almost 
doubled over the past five years, according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute and it supplies arms to 37 countries, although three-quarters of 
the exports were within the Asia-Pacific region, led by Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.36 
A long-standing Achilles’ heel of the Chinese defense industry being 
addressed by defense planners is a lack of higher-end manufacturing capability. 
Currently, SASTIND is in the process of preparing a ‘2025 Defense Science and 
Technology Plan’ that will align closely with the national-level ‘Made in China 2025 
Advanced Manufacturing Plan’ and ‘Internet Plus’ Plan that are aimed at lifting the 
overall level of the country’s industrial equipment manufacturing base and curtailing 
excessive dependence on foreign core technology and products. The defense 
industry features prominently in the ‘Made in China 2025’ plan, especially the space 
and aviation sectors.37 
                                                          
36 “China Almost Doubles Weapons Exports over Past Five Years, with Pakistan Biggest Buyer: Think Tank,” 
South China Morning Post, 22 February 2016.   
37 “’Defense 2025’ is Coming Soon: Aero-Engines May Become the Breakthrough”, Xinhua News Agency, 19 
June 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-06/19/c_127931606.htm. 
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Implications for the U.S. 
The emergence of the Chinese defense industry and acquisition system as an 
increasingly capable and peer competitor has enormous implications and challenges 
for the U.S, which can be assessed at three levels: geo-strategic, industrial, and 
acquisition. 
At the geo-strategic domain, the two countries are increasingly engaged in an 
escalating arms competition with each other. While the Third Offset Strategy is 
focused at rectifying the overall global erosion in US defense technological pre-
eminence, the top challenge over the next 25‒30 years comes from the ‘great 
powers’ of Russia and China. Although the Pentagon is deeply concerned with 
Russian aggression in the short to medium term, China “embodies a more enduring 
strategic challenge,” according to US Deputy Defense Secretary Work.38 
The Third Offset Strategy has a number of characteristics, in which China 
looms large as the ‘pacing threat’: 
 Conventional deterrence against great powers: The central tenet of the 
US strategy is to develop a dominant conventional deterrent against 
Russia and China that reduces the chances of major military conflict 
between them. 
 Asymmetric competition: Avoid competing in quantitative arms races 
with potential adversaries and instead focus on developing technologically 
superior quality that would compensate for the numerical superiority 
enjoyed by these rivals. 
 Strategy based, technology-oriented: While technology is important, 
operational strategies and organizational constructs are also key elements 
in gaining advantages against numerically stronger opponents. 
 Cost Imposition: With constrained resources, the U.S. is looking at ways 
to shift the cost equation that is heavily in favor of China by seeking to 
impose higher costs such as forcing the Chinese to invest in areas that 
are extremely expensive and in which the U.S. has a technological edge, 
like in autonomy. 
 Operational level of war: The primary focus of the initiatives is in the 
operational planning and conduct of campaigns that consist of assigning 
                                                          
38 “Work Outlines Key Steps in Third Offset Tech Development,” Defense News, 14 December 2015.   
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missions, tasks, and resources to military organizations. The principal 
operational concerns that the Defense Department has are:39 
1. Growing vulnerability of its global system of military bases, especially 
those that are close to major potential adversaries in the Asia-Pacific 
and Europe; 
2. Increasing ability of opponents to detect, track, and engage US aircraft 
carriers and other major surface warships at extended ranges from 
their coasts; 
3. Build-up of modern integrated air defense systems that is making it 
increasingly difficult for US and allied airpower to enter into contested 
opposition airspace; 
4. Militarization of space that no longer makes it a sanctuary from military 
conflict. 
While the Third Offset Strategy is still at an early stage of development, it does 
signal that the United States has unambiguously taken its first consequential steps in 
engaging China directly in defense technological competition. From a US defense 
acquisition perspective, this strategy is being operationalized in the Long-Range 
Research and Development Planning Program, which is modeled on an effort 
started in the 1970s when the United States successfully offset Soviet military 
numerical superiority with disruptive technological capabilities such as stealth and 
precision strike.40 
While there is little open discussion by Chinese military or civilian officials 
about the technological threat posed by the United States, they have been 
responding vigorously at the defense acquisition level since the end of the 1990s, 
most notably with the 995 Plan, which can be viewed as the Chinese counterpart to 
the Third Offset Strategy. 
At the industrial level, the advances that the Chinese defense industry has 
accomplished over the past two decades have been impressive, but can they 
continue at such a rapid pace and in which direction will they lead? If the critical 
enabling factors that have been instrumental to this progress are still in place, then 
                                                          
39 Robert Martinage, Towards a New Offset Strategy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2014), 23‒32.   
40 “DoD Seeks Future Technology Via Development Plan,” DOD News, December 3, 2014, 
http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603745.   
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the prospects look encouraging for China’s continued defense technological 
transformation. 
Two particularly key drivers are leadership support and the threat 
environment. Xi Jinping will almost certainly stay at the leadership helm until the 20th 
CCP Congress in 2022, so leadership support for the defense industry will remain 
strong. China’s external security environment will remain complicated because of 
sovereignty disputes and structural competition with the U.S. and regional neighbors 
such as Japan. Moreover, the PLA’s efforts to build up its long-range power 
projection capabilities to support its increasingly global ambitions look set to 
continue. These factors make it likely that the generous levels of funding that the 
defense industry has received will continue at least over the course of the 13th Five 
Year Plan to end of this decade. 
However, the continued progress in the development of China’s defense 
technological capabilities rests on troubled foundations. The structural weaknesses 
of the defense industry makes it at serious risk of falling into a trapped transition, 
whereby key components are left unreformed or only partially reformed because of 
strong opposition from powerful interest groups. The negative consequences from 
this selective reform process has so far been masked by the abundance of 
resources flowing through the defense industry. But any tightening in budgets 
because of slowing economic growth could expose the fragilities of this deeply 
fragmented and flawed system. 
At the defense acquisition level, the impact and implications of Chinese 
developments for the U.S. can primarily revolves around competition in four critical 
areas: cost, schedule, performance, and innovation. Which country’s acquisition 
system are producing outcomes that are faster, cheaper, better, and bolder than the 
other side? The Chinese defense acquisition system is today competitive or ahead 
in cost and schedule, and is behind but narrowing the gap in performance and 
innovation. As long as the U.S. is able to maintain a healthy lead of at least one 
generation or more in the technological capability and innovation of its weapons 
systems, this offsets China’s advantages in schedule and cost. 
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But if China is able to succeed in narrowing the overall performance capability 
and innovation gap to within one and even half a generation and continues to 
maintain a decisive edge in schedule and cost, then it will have the upper hand in 
the acquisition competition with the U.S. A key question is whether the Chinese 
system is able to be faster and cheaper even as it becomes better and bolder? 
A central reason why the Chinese defense industry has been able to be keep 
costs down and accelerate the pace of acquisition is because it has operated on an 
absorption-based, good enough development model. But as the Chinese defense 
industry transitions to more of an original innovation-based, higher end development 
framework, risks grow significantly and this will impact on the costs and pace of the 
acquisition process. The underdeveloped Chinese defense acquisition system could 
very likely find itself overwhelmed and lacking the expertise, experience, and 
organizational, business, and management tools to manage an advanced 
technology and innovation enterprise. One key exception is a select number of 
projects that come under special attention and oversight from the highest levels of 
the civilian and military leaderships. But they are the exception rather than the rule 
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